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SECURITY INFORMATION

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FROM: Moscow

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 259, August 7, 3p.m.

DEPT PASS TOKYO, HONOLULU. SENT DEPT 259: RPTD INFO TOKYO 5,  
HONOLULU FOR SECRETARY 1.

Points of Tokuda art, which went forward EMBDES 58, Aug 5 (MYTEL  
243, Aug 4 rptd Tokyo 4); which warrant particular attn seem to  
me to be fol:

1. Art constantly refers to Commie movement in Japan as "the revolutionary movement." No attempt disguise it as movement of progressives or partisans of peace or labor or to claim for it any primary or important legal parliamentary aspirations. Party takes credit for bringing four million people on to streets May 1 and Tokuda points with evident pride and satis to fact hundreds were killed or wounded that occasion.
2. Art confirms other indications that major schism of party, as between Mao-led and Moscow-led tendencies, has been provisionally resolved in favor Moscow (use of Stalin's name before that of Mao etc).
3. Art nevertheless indicates that some degree schismatic disunity is still present (this also hinted in recent msg from Central Comite of Commie Party).
4. Art indicates decision to regard Japan not as itself an imperialist country but as a "dependent country" requiring a "natl-liberating natl revolution." This decision evidently taken only after long and anguished consideration in Moscow as well as in Tokyo (noteworthy that Tokuda art also appeared July 4 COMINFORM JOURNAL). We take this to indicate plans according to which large segments of non-Commie pop wld be induced to accept leadership Commie Party in eventual armed insurrection and civil war designed simultaneously to crush Yoshida govt and eject "Amer occupiers." This implies extensive united front tactics, comparable to those followed by Commies in Eur resistant movement against Gers during World War II, aimed not at eventual success within framework existing parliamentary structure after "liberation" but rather at complete revolutionary overthrow that structure and its replacement initially by People's Democracy of Chi Commie variety.

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This art, coming on heels many other indications, such as Stalin's msg to Jap people, recent msg of Central Comite Sov Commie Party, etc., indicates quite clearly primary objective Sov strategys in Far East is capture of Japan and elimination of US position by means of eventual Commie-led civil rebellion against Yoshida govt and US Forces. In pursuit this objective, Jap Commies are throwing off all pretense of being legal parliamentary party and are exposing themselves with cynical unconcern as straight revolutionary insurgents. Although eventual use of red army at some stage in revolutionary process cannot be regarded as impossible, it is quite evident Moscow wld much prefer to see Commie conquest Japan come thru development which cld be portrayed as domestic Jap upheaval, comparable to what happened in China, keeping its own armed forces aloof and giving us no oppor to charge Sov Govt with any overt internatl impropriety. While it may seem to us chances for success such design are slight, Moscow leaders must disagree with us on this point or they wld not attach so much import to it. I think we shld take their high hopes and intense interest as warning sign that we may well have underestimated domestic Commie capabilities in Japan. If we compare experiences of Jap Commie Party under imperial regime, when they were finally reduced to tiny and helpless underground group numbering less than 1,000 people, with experience subsequent to liberation, when they succeeded in increasing effective militant membership to over 200,000 apparently in gaining influence over civic and electoral behavior of considerable greater number, it is easier to understand how high Moscow leaders feel Jap Commie movement not likely to be successfully contained by mere normal workings of any liberal parliamentary system and that only restoration of ruthless regime of police repression, comparable to that exercised by former Jap Imperial Govt, wld present formidable obstacle eventual accomplishment Commie aims.

In conclusion, important note that this program, as Commies have conceived it, is one expressly designed to by-pass entirely effective operation of any regional mil defense arrangements, so far as Japan itself is concerned.

KENNAN

CWD:KC

NOTE: Relayed to Tokyo, Honolulu 8/7/52 noon JEF

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